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Abstract 
The paper explores the complexity of critical infrastructure and critical infrastructure failure (CIF), real life 
examples are used to discuss the complexity involved. The paper then discusses what Visualisation is and how 
Visualisation can be applied to a security situation, in particular critical infrastructure. The paper concludes by 
discussing the future direction of the research. 
Keywords 
Critical Infrastructure, critical infrastructure failure and Visualisation. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper is directed at the potential impact of the critical infrastructure failure (CIF) upon the commercial 
organisation. It concentrates on a local perspective, which is much narrower than the general thrust of the 
relevant literature on a topic much more directed toward a national approach. Events such as the September 11, 
2001 terrorist attack on World Trade Centre and the devastating 2004 Boxing Day tsunami which killed more 
than 225,000 people in Indonesia have brought the failure of critical infrastructure into acute focus. Both cause 
and effect of CIF are complex phenomena. A single cause may produce a cascade effect as when a computing 
failure causes an electrical breakdown which then causes a mass failure of human services throughout a broad 
geographical area. The effect may involve not just the failure of physical systems, examples of which include 
the power grid, water, transportation, and communications, but the socio-technical systems which depend upon 
them, for example, the financial network, food distribution and communications systems. Not least, the 
influence of human behaviour, regulatory agencies, and government must be factored in. As implied in this brief 
statement of the complexity of CIF, a hierarchy of “failure gravity” may be surmised from the firm’s viewpoint. 
The firm’s situation in an area devastated by flood is a very different prospect from a firm which has 
experienced a computing malfunction. But in both situations the firm is at risk although mitigation procedures 
may be implemented and potential consequences or losses assessed. Research in the area is minimal and 
research in the domain of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) awareness of the risk of CIF is at best elusive. To the 
CEO, a quantitative demonstration of risk is inscrutable; a visual presentation is potentially far more powerful. 
Visualisation has been a topic of both academic research and commercial practice over the last decade, as a tool 
for analysis and education. This paper will explore some of the issues that relate to Visualisation and CIF. 
 
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE (CI) 
In October 1997 the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) in the US defined 
Critical Infrastructure as “a network of independent, mostly privately-owned, man-made systems and processes 
that function collaboratively and synergistically to produce and distribute a continuous flow of essential goods 
and services”. (PCCIP, 1997) This definition was later expanded by the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office 
Proceedings of the 9th Australian Information Warfare and Security Conference 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
49 
 
(CIAO) to include food/agriculture (production, storage, and distribution), space, numerous commodities (iron 
and steel, aluminium, finished goods, etc.), the health care industry, and the educational system. The CIAO 
defined infrastructure as “the framework of interdependent networks and systems comprising identifiable 
industries, institutions (including people and procedures), and distribution capabilities that provide a reliable 
flow of products and services essential to the defense and economic security of the United States, the smooth 
functioning of governments at all levels, and society as a whole” (CIAO, 1998). 
 
In Australian terms the scope of critical infrastructure is classified as: 
• Communications (Telecommunications (Phone, Fax, Internet, Cable, Satellites) and Electronic Mass 
Communications), 
• Energy (Gas, Petroleum Fuels, Refineries, Pipelines, Electricity Generation and Transmission), 
• Banking and Finance (Banking, Finance, and Trading Exchanges), 
• Food Supply (Bulk Production, Storage, and Distribution), 
• Emergency Services, 
• Health (Hospitals, Public Health, and Research and Development Laboratories), 
• Icons and Public Gatherings (Buildings (e.g., Sydney Opera House), 
• Cultural, Sport, and Tourism), 
• Transport (Air Traffic Control, Road, Sea, Rail and Inter-modal (Cargo Distribution Centers)), 
• Utilities (Water, Waste Water, and Waste Management).Communications (Telecommunications 
(Phone, Fax, Internet, Cable, satellites) and Electronic Mass Communications) 
(Abele-Wigert and Dunn, 2006) 
 
Other nations have similar classifications. CI is classified from the perspective of national population survival in 
the event of major catastrophe. We have chosen to adopt the definition put forth by the U.S. Patriot Act, which 
identifies a critical infrastructure to be: systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United 
States (or indeed any country) that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a 
debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination 
of those matters (Tolone et al., 2004). Under this definition, critical infrastructures may be organised according 
to the following sectors: agriculture, food, water, public health, emergency services, government, defense 
industrial base, information and telecommunications, energy, transportation, banking and finance, chemical 
industry and hazardous materials, postal and shipping, and national monuments and icons (Tolone et al., 2004). 
 
Critical Infrastructure Interdependence 
The cascading nature of infrastructure collapse is a major complicating factor in security analysis. The 
complexity of interdependence of critical infrastructures has been widely recognised and there have been a 
number of attempts to model its dynamics. The following figure (figure 1) illustrations discuss some of the 
approaches that have been attempted 
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 Figure 1 Critical Infrastructure Interdependency (Benes, 2007) 
The nature of the problem is simply shown in Figure 1 by Benes (2007). The direct impact of a terrorist attack, 
natural disaster or technological failure on the electrical grid may then impact technology interests, such as a 
chemical plant, which may then cause severe social effects upon community health. 
Pederson et al. (2006) contrived a simple illustration of the ties and dependencies of affected infrastructure in 
the single example of Hurricane Katrina as shown in Figure 2. “The solid lines crossing sectors and connecting 
nodes, represent internal dependencies, while the dashed lines represent dependencies that also exist between 
different infrastructures” (Pederson et al ). The top grid, for example shows the connectivity of the affected 
electrical substations and which of these caused a particular sewage pumping station to fail. Similarly, a power 
failure in two electrical substations caused a communications breakdown  
Rinaldi et al. (2001) in a much more detailed analysis have identified a number of principles. These have been 
constructed around a framework proposed by the PCCIP (1997) and comprise six dimensions (and shown by 
Figure 2): 
• Infrastructure characteristics 
• Type of failure 
• State of operation 
• Types of interdependencies 
• Environment 
• Coupling and response failure 
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Figure 2 Critical Infrastructure Interdependency (Pederson et al., 2006) 
An overriding principle of interdependency between two infrastructures may be unidirectional or bidirectional. 
In the first case, a pumping station supplying water to a community depends upon the electrical supply system 
but no dependency exists in the other direction. In the second case, a computer system and its electrical supply 
may be dependant upon each other. It is beyond the scope of this proposal to discuss the above framework in 
detail. However, discussion of a couple of the above dimensions will be instructive. The types of 
interdependencies, for example, consist of physical, cyber, logical and geographic. Physical interdependency is 
the direct linkage between two ‘agents’ such that the output of one is input to the other. Cyber interdependency 
is informational so that an infrastructure depends upon information from a computer as infrastructure to 
maintain its operation. Geographic interdependency is spatial and can occur when geographical proximity is 
such that the malfunction of one infrastructure can affect the operation of another, for example a coaxial cable 
attached to a collapsed bridge. Logical interdependency occurs in the absence of physical connections but where 
the functionality of one infrastructure, say a finance system, is dependant upon the integrity of another, say the 
computer system. A substantial insight into the protection of infrastructure is the dimension labelled 
Environment (see list above). This focuses upon the “framework in which the owners and operators establish 
goals and objectives, construct value systems for defining and viewing their businesses, model and analyse their 
operations, and make decisions that affect infrastructure architectures and operations” (Rinaldi et al. 2001; 
Sage, 1992). Economic and business opportunities and concerns, public policy, and legal and regulatory 
concerns are topics discussed as part of this dimension.  
The conclusion reached by these authors is the scope of the challenge posed by the interdependence of the six 
dimensions of infrastructure and their individual attributes in planning for and mitigating against failure. Models 
of infrastructure have been built in many individual circumstances but simulation is a greater challenge. From 
the national viewpoint, a complete model of infrastructure would need to be built and this itself is an adaptive 
and evolving mechanism, the data needed on a real time basis to feed it and, importantly, its protection as the 
model itself would be an attractive target for cyber terrorists.  
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Figure 3 Economic Complexities (Borg, 2005) 
Borg (2005) simply illustrates 3 types of interdependence as shown in Figure 3. If a path is redundant, that is 
two or more paths run in parallel as in (a), and one is compromised the total process will continue. The system is 
relatively robust. In (b), where one process depends upon many preceding processes, i.e., they are 
interdependent, which is the case in many assembly industries, and if a process which fits early into the system 
is compromised, many others will be thrown into disarray. This causes the well-known cascade effect. The final 
case (c), which is termed monopoly, is also a feature of many ‘high tech’ industries. A single company may 
provide under patent a single part which is crucial to the assembly. If compromised the total assembly process 
will halt for lack of this part.  
Cyber Infrastructure 
Cyber infrastructure in a modern economy is crucial and varied. It is arguable that the majority of major 
organisations are dependant to some extent on the Internet, but the Internet as a structure itself was built with 
survivability as a key ingredient. It is unlikely, therefore, that it will be destroyed. However, as more 
organisations establish websites and conduct business through the Internet, this connectivity to the external 
environment renders their web and application servers vulnerable. Further as Henderson (2007) states, technical 
advances increase this vulnerability. For example, “Internet facing systems allow remote maintenance which 
saves money but opens systems to network-based attacks. Wireless architecture reduces network costs but opens 
internal network up to wireless attacks” (Henderson, 2007).  
The Internet is not only used for commerce. Increasingly, the SCADA (Supervisory Control And Data 
Acquisition) which refers to a large-scale, distributed measurement (and control) systems are Internet connected. 
Besides, in the US, 85% of CI is owned by the private sector and roughly 50% of CI sectors are controlled by 
SCADA systems (Henderson, 2007). Since this control technology is also vendor provided, any security 
strategy for process control must also be vendor built. SCADA systems are a good example of interdependency 
as discussed above. For, example, if a SCADA system which monitors and controls an electrical grid were to be 
compromised, this would prevent further control of the components of the grid as well as preventing the flow of 
information to other decision making processes that depend upon it. An emergency system, for example, might 
not receive data and be incapable of responding (Pederson et al, 2006). 
In the cyber domain as in other CI domains it is important to identify the high risk areas of the existing 
infrastructure: the single points of failure and the recovery time limitations. But particularly for IT systems, it is 
important to identify the business critical applications and the systems that they run on as well as the areas of 
vulnerability within the environment (Shannon, 2002). SCADA systems are clearly a crucial candidate. These 
“threat vectors” comprise information about where a threat may originate and the assets it exposes to risk. 
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Henderson (2007) classifies threats to IT as structured and unstructured. Structured threats include: 
• Bot-network operators,  
• Criminal groups, 
• Foreign intelligence services,  
• Hackers,  
• Insiders,  
• Phishers,  
• Spammers,  
• Spyware/malware authors, 
 
While unstructured threats include:  
• Recreational hackers (“hacking for fun”), 
• Malware (viruses and worms), 
• Malicious insiders (disgruntled employees). 
 
A more complete table of sources, threats and targets is found in Braggs et al, 2004 and is reproduced as table 1. 
Sources Threats Targets 
  Computer and peripheral 
 Computer Theft Communications equipment 
 Intellectual property, theft or loss Physical premises 
 Confidential information exposure Power, water, environmental control 
Employees Financial fraud and communication facilities 
Cleaning staff Impersonation Supplies and data storage media 
Internet Attackers Harassment Operating systems 
Contractors Espionage Computer Programs 
Competitors Denial of Service Documentation 
Terrorists Software Malfunctions Information and data 
Accidents Data deletion Individual privacy 
Weather Data modification Privacy of Intellectual property 
 Data addition E-mail 
 Corruption of data integrity  Entities connected on the network 
 Misuse of data Telephone 
 Loss of data Voice Mail 
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 Human errors Fax machines 
 Physical hazards Information 
 Equipment malfunctions Employee productivity 
 Health and safety of people  
Table 1. IT Threats, sources and targets (Braggs et al, 2004) 
 
THE ENTERPRISE PERSPECTIVE 
From the viewpoint of the organisation there are basically two scenarios. The first concerns those phenomena 
which may cause critical infrastructure failure (CIF) but over which the organisation has no control. Floods, 
earthquakes, etc would fall into this category and for most organisations the probability of occurrence is very 
low. The second concerns those phenomena over which the organisation does have some control. This would 
include cyber failure where the probability of occurrence is greater than for natural phenomena. Regardless of 
the probability of occurrence, protection and mitigation procedures may be taken. However, in spite of 
investigating theoretical models of organisations no suitable structure around which a critical resource model 
may be built seems to exist. There are some, however, discussed below that provide some valuable clues to 
possible components. 
 
Resource Based Advantage 
The Resource Based Advantage model posited by Barney (1991) is basically about competitive advantage and 
suggests that organisations derive this from imperfectly inimitable or non-substitutable resources. Other 
commentators such as Duncan (1998) emphasise that this view is also true in the IT world where resources are 
particularly volatile, their value is heterogeneous across organisations and both of these serve to create an 
environment of uncertainty. It is the unobservable aspects of resources, namely organisational routines, 
management, knowledge, learning and the resultant capabilities (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990) developed by the 
organisation which are both inimitable and frequently non-understandable (Roy and Aubert, 2002) that yield 
competitive advantage. Duncan (1998) had already identified that, in an environment of extreme volatility, IT 
knowledge and expertise is a resource that an organisation has difficulty in acquiring and maintaining. But she 
also appreciated its value, in conjunction with a knowledge of the business and its environment, in recognising 
opportunities and implementing strategic initiatives. The value of this approach is that it identifies a subset of 
organisational resources and implies that it is the use of these resources, including IT expertise that constitutes 
CI and is subject to failure. 
Porters Value Chain Analysis 
Perhaps one the most widely known models of the organisation is Porter’s Value Chain Analysis which 
identifies a firm's core competencies and distinguishes those activities that drive competitive advantage. The 
model classifies the cost structure of an organisation into separate processes or functions and assumes that the 
cost drivers for each of these activities behave differently. Porter constructs a generic template consisting of five 
primary activities and four support activities shown as follows: 
 
Primary activities: 
1. Inbound logistics: materials handling, warehousing, inventory control, transportation; 
Proceedings of the 9th Australian Information Warfare and Security Conference 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
55 
 
2. Operations: machine operating, assembly, packaging, testing and maintenance; 
3. Outbound logistics: order processing, warehousing, transportation and distribution; 
4. Marketing and sales: advertising, promotion, selling, pricing, channel management; 
5. Service: installation, servicing, spare part management; 
Support activities: 
6. Firm infrastructure: general management, planning, finance, legal, investor relations;  
7. Human resource management: recruitment, education, promotion, reward systems; 
8. Technology development: research & development, IT, product and process development; 
9. Procurement: purchasing raw materials, lease properties, supplier contract negotiations. 
The aggregation of these functions describes a complete organisation. Any loss of functionality would impact to 
some extent on the organisation and cause minimal or major financial loss. An interruption to the supply of 
materials, for example, would disrupt the production schedule and have serious financial implications whereas 
the organisation would suffer only minimally if a server malfunctioned and disrupted the education and training 
schedule. The Porter model includes service infrastructure (see 6 above) but, from the perspective of this 
research paper a physical infrastructure is also necessary. The housing of both the primary and support activities 
is clearly crucial as well as the equipment, principally computer equipment, which facilitates the activities.  
 
The Input-Output Model 
This is not strictly an organisational model but is included here because it provides a valuable perspective in 
quantifying the value of services to business functions (Rose, 2006). Figure 4 is a simple illustration of its 
underlying philosophy. For example, households funnel payments to markets for goods and services, which 
translate into revenue to the businesses that produce them. Businesses then make payments to the markets for 
factors of production, which generates household income.  
 
 
Figure 4 Basic Circular flow of the Economy (Rose, 2006) 
The model is embellished in Figure 5 to include the intermediate means of production since businesses also need 
various types of raw and processed materials in addition to labour and capital to produce goods and services, as 
well as various services. Figure 5 also includes household activities to include the combining of market goods 
and services with time and household resources to yield “household production,” i.e.,. cooked meals, recreation, 
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etc. And the requirement for infrastructure is acknowledged in the model in both business and household 
activities. 
 
Figure 5 Expanded Circular flow of the Economy (Rose, 2006) 
This model is incomplete without an accompanying matrix showing the interdependence of infrastructures. This 
is formed by mapping the sectors of the economy and infrastructures against each other. A simplistic example is 
shown in Figure 4. The LHS column row headings represent inputs and the column headings represent 
consumption. The contents of the cells are dollar values. So, for example, the figure 100 as shown matrix 
represents the value, say $100 million that the construction industry absorbs in electricity costs per annum (as 
shown by Table 2 and Table 2).  
 
 M
i
n
i
n
g 
Constru
ction 
Electric 
Utilities 
Water Manufa
cturing 
Trade Transp
ortation 
Comm
unicati
on 
Inform
ation 
Mining           
Construction           
Electric Utilities   $100m        
Water           
Manufacturing           
Trade           
Transportation           
Communication           
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Information           
Table 2  Input/Output Table - General 
 Wareh
ouse 
Manufa
cturing  
Marketi
ng 
Distribu
tion 
Transporta
tion 
IT Electric 
Utilities 
Water Commu
nication 
          
Warehouse          
Manufacturing          
Marketing          
Distribution          
Transportation          
IT  $1 m        
Electric 
Utilities 
         
Water          
Communication          
Table 3 Input/Output Table- Specific 
Clearly this matrix has to be constructed to represent the entity under examination which is commonly the 
region. The value of the model is the identification of those key sectors of the regional economic structure and 
their quantification on dollar terms. From the organisational perspective it would need to be modified to 
represent economic sectors of the organisation and the infrastructural sectors that service them (See Figure 5 
previously). Internal transfer value could also be quantified in this way although the degree of granularity would 
need to be considered.  For example, it might be that the IT contribution the manufacturing is valued at $1 
million but the separate value of electricity to each economic sector of the organisation might be too greater 
level of detail. The value of this model is that it identifies the dollar value (cost) of all functions within the 
organisation and the composition of that cost in a simple matrix form. 
 
The Risk Calculation 
This section demonstrates two simple risk calculations in common use depending upon the source of the threat. 
The first of these is more appropriate for an accidental, that is, non–intentional cause. In this case risk is a 
function of the probability of a threat modified by the vulnerability of the potential target of that threat and 
quantified by the financial damage that it would cause. Risk, therefore, is measured in financial terms, which is 
extremely meaningful to a CEO. So, for example, the threat of a earthquake to a business in Melbourne is very 
low, say .00000001. If, however, a earthquake were to occur, because the threat was so low, it would be 
economically infeasible that the organisation take any effective, expensive mitigating actions to reduce the 
threat even though the consequences in terms of damage might be very high.  
Formula 1: Risk = Threat x Vulnerability x Consequence (Henderson, 2007) 
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Threat Any person, circumstance or event with the potential to cause loss or 
damage. 
Vulnerability  Any weakness that can be exploited by an adversary or through accident. 
Consequence  The amount of loss or damage that can be expected from a successful attack. 
Formula 2: Threat = Ability x Vulnerability x Intention   (Benes, 2007) 
The second calculation is a modification of the term ‘threat’ and is more suitable to the circumstances of 
intention. In this case, threat is not simply an ‘act of God’ but rather a function of deliberate strategy. This 
maybe represented by a terrorist or malicious employee targeting a specific area of critical infrastructure. For 
example, in 1999 one of the employees of the contractor involved in installing a new sewage pumping and 
treatment system for the council of Maroochy Shire in Queensland, Australia applied for employment with the 
council and was refused. (Byrnes, 2005) Between Jan 2000 and Apr 2000 the perpetrator released 264,000 
gallons of raw sewage in 46 separate attacks into public waterways, which spilled into local parks as well as the 
grounds of a Hyatt Regency hotel. This was the first known use of a digital control system to attack public 
infrastructure. “Software on his laptop identified him as “Pumping Station 4” and after suppressing alarms 
controlled 300 SCADA nodes” the perpetrator was able to compromise vital infrastructure (Henderson, 2007). 
Conceptually, therefore, each point of failure is subject to an analysis based upon the Formula 1 and 2 above. 
This implies that the basic variables are risk, mitigation and loss. The points of failure are multiple. Not only are 
the major public utilities involved, as seen in Figure 6, but the predominant position of computer in control 
situations, such as SCADA systems are truly critical in a situation where the major utilities have largely passed 
into private hands. 
 
Management 
The purpose of this section is to discuss the type of information that top management requires. There is an 
extensive literature about organisational management and management techniques (Drucker, 2006; Drucker and 
Senge, 2001, Pande et al, 2000; Mitzeburg, 1993, 2002; Argyris, 1987) and this has been expanding with the 
rapid adoption of electronic commerce and virtual organisations (Davidow and Malone, 1993; Tapscott, 1996) 
and globalisation (Ohmae, 2000). Many specific organisations have been examined in an attempt to discover 
organisational secrets of efficiency, eg. IBM (Moulton Reger, 2006), CISCO (Stauffer, (2000), Microsoft 
(Wallace, 1998) and many analyses have been made of organisational effectiveness (Peters and Waterman, 
1984). On a broader scale, national strategies have also been discussed. Japan in particular has been the frequent 
focus of attention (Porter el al., 2000). But, from the point of view of this research proposal, effectiveness is to 
be pursued on a much smaller scale, that of managerial performance and particularly that of the CEO. The CEO 
has the responsibility of managing the entire organisation and so has the broadest span of control. The CEO is 
responsible for establishing policies, is future oriented, represents the organisation’s interaction with its 
environment and takes responsibility for any consequences (Marakos, 2003). As such the information gathering 
needs of the CEO are of prime concern and must be both specialised and succinct. A popular and comprehensive 
method of determining the information needs centres around Critical Success Factors was developed by Rockart 
and Treacy (1982). Similarly a popular and (depending on its implementation) comprehensive method of 
presenting information to the CEO is the Executive Information System (EIS) which should provide (amongst 
other facilities) unstructured query support and graphical output (Marakos, 2003). 
The concept of this study is the capacity to create an impression by the visualisation of leading executives 
regarding aspects of their organisational environment that are both varied and rarely aggregated. Critical 
infrastructure failure (CIF) is multi-faceted and has uncalculated potential impact. Thus, both the content and 
presentation of relevant information to the CEO are important. As already stated, in the context of this proposal 
the types of information are disparate. For example, the potential for and effects of deliberate attack or 
Proceedings of the 9th Australian Information Warfare and Security Conference 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
59 
 
accidental damage to a cyber system are complex and varied. However, these are of a different nature and scope 
than the disruption to a supply chain due to a chemical spill. But this is all CIF and may need to be presented to 
the CEO in a single illustration. Yet the forms of data are dissimilar. It may, for example, be desirable to inform 
a CEO of the number of attacks that have been attempted on a cyber system, how these have been mitigated, the 
cost of mitigation and the potential loss had mitigation been unsuccessful. This mainly falls into the realm of 
information visualisation since a data base of statistics may have been gathered for this purpose. On the other 
hand, the effects of a flood are in a different league. Not only is it probable that a flood has never occurred, but 
there will be no data base of statistics available. This could mean that a concept visualisation might be more 
effective. We will return to this topic in a later section after we have briefly covered the fundamentals of 
visualisation. We conclude this section by stating that risk, migration and prospective loss are the major factors 
of interest to the CEO in securing the organisation from critical infrastructure failure. Even though we recognise 
the complexity of interdependency in CIF as mentioned above (see Figure 6), for the purpose of this proposal, 
we ignore this since much of this is outside the CEO’s control. The immediate organisational CI environment is 
of concern. For example, in the event of a power failure of the scope of the Auckland power failure of 1998 
(NZMoED, 1998), power may be considered as a single point of failure and mitigation procedures such as the 
installation of private electricity facilities might have solved this problem for any specific organisation. Similar 
blackouts have been experienced in 2003 in Canada and in California in 2001 which testifies to the likelihood of 
such a failure.  
 
VISUALISATION TECHNIQUES  
The volume and complexity of knowledge and information in the modern era are such that unless a structure is 
superimposed upon it, it remains relatively meaningless. The requirement for ‘information at your fingertips’ 
precludes a requirement for time-consuming interpretation (Keller and Tergan, 2005). Indeed, the currently 
prevalent state of demand in the commercial domain is, firstly, that information to be readily accessible by users 
and, secondly, that the implications of complex information to be readily apparent. In this context, an 
appreciation that the power of visualisation is the foundation of the human cognition processing system is 
crucial. The “power of a visualisation comes from the fact that it is possible to have a far more complex concept 
structure represented externally in a visual display than can be held in visual and verbal working memories" 
(Ware, 2005, p29). Ware (2004) maintains that the cognition process comprises the human natural ability of 
pattern finding and Baddeley (1998) argues that visualisations draw upon both the visual and working memory 
systems. Consensus seems to have been adopted amongst researchers that drawing on the breadth of the human 
cognition systems serves to mitigate the limitations of working memory in both the capacity and duration of 
stored information. 
Using visualisation as the interface between a computer-based information system and the flexible capabilities 
of human cognitive systems is an enormous enhancement over unaided cognition. Abstract relationships, 
particularly, are more easily processed by visualising links between elements (Cox, 1999) constituting a form of 
external cognition (Scaife and Rogers, 1996) resulting in what Rogers and Scaife (1997) refer to as 
‘computational offloading’. Presenting the audience with a diagram rather than a textual description allows it to 
exploit the rapid visual processing power of the human cognition system to make perceptual judgements rather 
than the laborious process of making logical ones (Paige and Simon, 1966). It may be, however, that visual 
clues may need to be augmented by verbal ones.  
The complexities of the visual system are such that the topic to be visualised needs to be contextualised within 
the scope of the visual system’s multiple capabilities and indeed of the sensory systems. Ebert (2005), for 
example, discusses ‘perceptualisation’ which includes several perceptual channels such as auditory, haptic and 
tactile, olfactory and kinesthesis. Ebert also discusses taking advantage of ‘preattentive’ visualisation, which 
involves low level parallel visual processing which requires no conscious cognitive effort. 
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Research into visualisation has broadly followed two avenues, the first being knowledge visualisation, adopted 
by the social scientists, and the second being information visualisation, adopted by the computer scientists 
(Keller and Tergan, 2005; Frank, H-J., Drosdol, J., 2005). Knowledge visualisation has an emphasis on 
conceptual knowledge and its visualisation potential. As such it focuses on the transformation of information to 
knowledge and is shown within a space characterised by knowledge elements and connections, so creating new 
meaning for eduction and decision making purposes. Mind maps and concept mapping are tools that are used to 
build a knowledge structure and to navigate around it. Information visualisation, by contrast, concerns the 
collection of data and its representation (i.e., objects, systems, events, processes, etc). in a visually spatial 
manner. It involves the representation of very lage and multivariate data sets generally for experts’ use, and 
often does not provide user-friendly navigation or interfaces (Frank, H-J., Drosdol, J., 2005). Munzner (2000) 
considers that this knowledge/information distinction is debatable but tentatively defines information 
visualisation as hinging “on finding a spatial mapping of data that is not inherently spatial” and knowledge 
visualisation as using “a spatial layout that is implicit in the data”. Pasha (2004) discusses the problems of the 
visualisation of abstract data. “With no natural mapping between data and graphical elements, the information 
designer is left with a considerable challenge to find a fit that that can maximise understanding and usability” 
(p9). 
We do not at this stage definitely select the domain into which this project falls since some data may be a natural 
fit and others may require a conceptual mapping. Our goal, by contrast, is much simpler to define. Roberts 
(2004) maintains that any visual system must have one of three goals: presentation, analysis or tactics. The first 
of these involves using the capacity of the human visual system to absorb immediately the implications of a 
situation or scenario. The conclusion is already known; basically this goal is about education. The second goal 
involves using a visual interface to find a conclusion from appropriately presented data. The third or tactical 
goal is to decide upon a course of action where time, or the lack of it, is of the essence. Military or stock market 
scenarios would be suitable contenders. In this proposal, consider that the main objective is to impact the CEO 
of the potential downside of CIF. If the project was restricted to data gathered as a result of attempted intrusions 
into an organisational cyber system, that data would have been organised into local data sets and would provide 
a simple mapping operation. If, however, the project incorporates the possible failure of power and 
communication systems, mapping will be a more complex function. Regardless, the focus is firmly on reader 
comprehensibility, enabled by information content and insight (Hanson et al, 1994). Clearly, in the simplest 
presentation case, diagrams will produce better performance than verbal representations, especially for more 
complex problems (Mayer, 1976). In the simplest case, Munzer (2002) considers that “graphs have a natural 
visual representation as nodes and connecting links arranged in space” and so are, not surprisingly, pervasive. 
Even in problem solving, Carroll, Thomas and Malhotra (1980) “found that spatial layouts of isomorphic design 
problems resulted in better performances and shorter solution times than temporal representations” (quoted in 
Jonassen, 2005) 
 
Importance of Visualisation in the Security Context 
The purpose of this section is to emphasise the importance of visualisation in those areas which concern 
security. There are two principal reasons. Firstly, the detail of security is wide-ranging. The classification of 
infrastructure defined before (Abele-Wigert and Dunn, 2006) is a stark demonstration of the range of potential 
failures that may affect the performance of an organisation in the event of failure. In many cases organisations 
have no disaster plan or an untested one. In 2002 a VERITAS Disaster Recovery Survey suggested that 72% of 
all businesses have either no business continuity plan, never tested their plan, their plan failed when they tested 
it and only 18% of end user data is protected. (Shannon, 2002). Shannon also quotes Gartner (Roberta Witty, 
Donna Scott, 12 September 2001) who assert that "Two out of five enterprises that experience a disaster go out 
of business within five years. Business continuity plans and disaster recovery services ensure continuing 
viability.” A further quote from the Meta group states that “CIOs who fail to conduct a business impact analysis 
risk over- committing or under-investing resources in disaster prevention and contingent recovery operations”. 
The second reason that visualisation in the area of security is important is its complexity. The cascading effect 
of inter-dependent CIF is difficult to assess. Of the many areas of CI that organisations depend upon for normal 
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business functionality it may be argued that the most complex is the cyber infrastructure. This has also been 
thrown into prominence because of the high profile of hacking and computer software failure. It will be shown 
later in this proposal that the circumstances of cyber failure are probable and frequent and there are complex 
safeguards and mitigations. However, both the breadth and complexity of security concerns present problems in 
enlightening the CEO to the potential impact of disaster and might well be responsible for the dearth of business 
impact analysis and recovery plans. Many visualisations which have an analysis objective in complex areas are 
totally unsuitable for the CEO. But a principal objective of visualisation is the presentation of data. We argue 
that the only way to educate CEOs and other executives to the risk and consequences of CIF is an appropriate 
presentation of data that visualisation makes possible. In the ensuing sections we illustrate many visualisation 
possibilities and this proposal has the objective to explore them and develop both a suitable model for CIF and 
its appropriate visualisation. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The research described in the paper is part of a larger research project that is being conducted. The paper 
describes the complexity of Critical Infrastructure and failure and discuss the advantages that the visualisation 
technique could pose when be applied in this context.  
 
The area of future research relates to the ways that visualisation can be used to best explain the complexity of 
understanding and how it can be used to understand Critical Infrastructure and especially its complexity. The 
aim next is to model a complex Critical Infrastructure scenario using visualisation techniques in order to allow a 
greater understanding of the situation. 
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